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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD M. JOHNSTON, SHAUNA M.
JOHNSTON, THOMAS W. McDONALD,
and LOIS S. McDONALD,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vs.
LLOYD H. AUSTIN, VIRGINIA ANN
AUSTIN, INCOME REALTY AND
MORTGAGE, INC., a Utah corporation, BOYD E. NELSON,
BARBARA L. NELSON, JOHN
FRANKS, DAVID J. ISBELL,
and RUTH ANN ISBELL,

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Civil No. 19401

Defendants/Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is Plaintiffs' appeal of an Order entered by
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on August 19, 1983, denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing their
Complaint with prejudice, and granting Defendants, Nelsons',
Motion for Summary Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This is a case dealing with a sellers' remedies
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
Appellants,

On September 15, 1982,

the sellers, filed a Complaint in Davis County,

Utah, seeking to foreclose as a mortgage Respondents'

(Aus-

tins) interest in certain real property because of a failure
hy Austins to timely pay amounts due under the Contract.

The

-2Trial Court denied Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment
seeking an order of foreclosure and granted Respondents,
Nelsons', Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which resulted
in the dismissal of Appellants' Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the Trial Court's
Orders dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint and granting Respondents, Nelsons', Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Appel-

lants also seek an Order granting Appellants' Motion for
Summary Judgment allowing Appellants to foreclose the Respondents' interest in the subject property, pursuant to the
terms of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract executed
between Appellants and Respondents, Austins.
Respondents seek an affirmance of the Trial
Court's Orders dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint and granting
Respondents, Nelsons', Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Respondents also seek their attorney's fees on the grounds
that this action is without merit and is not brought in good
faith.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal,

the Respondents,

Nelsons, agree with the Statement of Facts as they are outlineo
in Appellants' Brief with the following minor changes:

-3With respect to the Escrow Agreement made reference
to on page 3 of Appellants' Brief, it is clear from the facts
that the Appellants acquiesced to the Escrow Agreement and
accepted payments from the Escrow Company for a period of
almost two years (R 185, 203, 221, 222, and 242 at page 10).
It should also be noted that the first definite
written notice that any of the defendants received with respect to the default came on July 19, 1982 and no prior
written notice was given to any of the defendants.
100, 144, 174, 185, 198,

203,

(R 9, 93,

222, and 242 at pages 6,

7, 12,

13, and 16).

Respondents, Nelsons, agree with Appellants'
Statement of the Facts with the aforementioned additions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEMAND FOR CURE RECEIVED BY THE
BUYERS AND NOTICE OF ACCELERATION
WERE INSUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE
SELLERS OF THE PROPERTY TO FORECLOSE BUYERS' INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY.
It is clear from the record that the buyers of
the real property tendered the June 15, 1982 and the July 15,
1982 payments to Escrow Services,
197,

203, and 222).

l>y t:scrow Services,

Inc.

(R 23,

24, 63,

99,

The June 15, 1982 payment was forwarded
Inc. on their corporate account and the

check was returned due to insufficient funds.

The Austins

-4were contacted by the buyers concerning the failure to receive
the June and July, 1982 payments in a timely manner and verbaJ
notice of the default was given to Austins with respect to the
default.

At no time, however, did sellers send a written

notice to Austins or any other party defendant stating what
was necessary to cure the default and the action required
Defendants.
After the 30 day period called for in the contract,
sellers first gave written notice of the default and exercised
their option under the contract to accelerate the total
balance due and treat the contract as a note and a mortgage,
Twenty-seven days after Austins first received
written notice of the default, tender was made of the delinquent amounts due to Appellants.

Appellants refused to accept

the tender and indicated that they would pursue remedies
under paragraph 16c of the contract.

The Trial Court ruled

as a Conclusion of Law that the tender on August 16, 1982 was
timely with respect to the delinquencies and defaulted payments since that tender occurred less than 30 days after the
first written notice of default was submitted to Austins.
The Trial Court also ruled that written notice and demand
must be given before the sellers could exercise their option
to declare the contract as a note and mortgage.

This ruling

required two notices, one of default and another electing
sellers' remedy and exercising that remedy.

-5-

This Court has had ample opportunity in the past
to review the default provisions found in real estate contracts.
consistently, the Court has held that said default provisions
are not self-executing and that written notice must be given
to the defaulting party stating what is necessary to cure the
default and giving to the defaulting party a reasonable opportunity to cure the default.

In LaMont v. Evjen, 29 Utah 2d

266, 508 P.2d. 532 (Utah 1973), issues similar to those before the Court on this appeal were presented.

In that case,

the buyers under a Uniform Real Estate Contract had missed a
payment in December, 1970.

A written notice was sent to the

buyers asking them to bring the contract payments current.
That written notice was sent on February 2, 1972.

On Febru-

ary 29, 1972, sellers' attorney wrote a letter which was
delivered to buyers on March 6, 1972 directing them to bring
all past due payments current.

Later that same month, sel-

lers mailed a certified letter to buyers stating that they
were electing to treat the Uniform Real Estate Contract as a
note and a mortgage and foreclose upon the property immediately with the entire unpaid balance becoming due and payable.

This letter was received by buyers on April 3, 1972

and on that same day all past due installments were tendered.
This Court held:
Before a seller of land under a Uniform Real
Estate Contract can exercise
of the opt ions given him because of a failure on the

-6-

part of a purchaser to pay an installment as
promised he must give the purchaser notice of
the default and a reasonable time in which to
bring the contract current .
This is
so because the debt does not become due on
the mere default in payment, but by aff irmative action by which the creditor makes it
known to the debtor that he intends to declare the whole debt due.
Id. at 534.
(Emphasis added).
The rule enunciated in LaMont v. Evjen is dispositive of the issues before the Court in this appeal.

In

the instant action, no written notice of default was ever
served upon the original buyers, the Austins, or any of the
subsequent purchasers of the property.

The only written

notice that was ever received was the notice of foreclosure
sent by Appellants on July 19, 1982.
The Court in LaMont v. Evjen was dealing with
the foreclosure provisions of paragraph 16c as is the Court
in the instant action.

Buyers tender of all of the delinquent

installments due 27 days after the notice of acceleration was
served was a reasonable tender in light of the circumstances
and the bankruptcy of Escrow Services, Inc.
The contract itself calls for a 30 day grace period and this Court in Call v. Timber Lakes Corporation, 567
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) found that 22 days was not an unreasonable time for a defendant to tender performance after notice
of default.

It should be noted that in Timber Lakes, the

defaulting party was given notice in writing with respect to

-7the arrearages.

In the real estate contract cases which have

come before this Court, without exception, the sellers seeking
to enforce the provisions of the contract had given written
notice of their intention to exercise their remedies under
the contract.
Mt,

See Beneficial Life Insurance Company v.Den-

24 Utah 2d 310, 470 P.2d 406 (Utah 1970).
In the case at bar, the Austins were given verbal

notice that the payments had not been received.

The record

is unclear as to the content of those verbal notices, but it
appears clear that said notices did not inform buyers of
sellers' election of remedies or what was necessary to cure
the default.

The first and only written notice received by

buyers was the notice of acceleration and at that point in
time there was nothing more which could be done to cure the
default other than tender the entire balance due.

This Court

in Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976) held that
the provisions of a real estate contract, though not a Uniform Real Estate Contract are not self-executing and that
some affirmative act on the part of the seller is required.
The Court stated:
The contractual relations between seller and
buyer are in existence until such time as the
seller chooses to notify the defaulting buyer
of its election to proceed under one or all
of its options.
In so doing, seller must
yive the defaulting buyer a reasonable time
within which to cure the default.
Without
this notice, the defaulting buyer would not
know what to do.
Id. at 1154.

-8-

In the instant action,

the verbal notice to 1i 11 y_

ers was ineffective because said notice did not notify
defaulting party what was necessary to cure the default.

In

addition, a reasonable time within which to cure the rlefauJt
was not given in light of all of the circumstances.
record shows, payments for June and July,

As the

1982 were tenrleren

to Escrow Services, Inc. which filed for bankruptcy.

Within

30 days after their first written notice of default, buyers
tendered the total delinquent amounts due to sellers.
In Appellants' Brief,
American Savings
289,

&

they cite to the case of

Loan Association v. Blomquist,

21 Utah 2d

445 P.2d 1 (Utah 1968) for the proposition that foreclo-

sure is appropriate in the case at bar.
from the Blomquist case, however,

It should be noted

that the defaulting party

was consistently late in making monthly payments and the defaulting party did not increase the monthly payments to correspond with increased insurance and tax reserves.

Written

notices and demands for payment were sent to the defaulting
party notifying them of the default.

Said notices also in-

cluded sufficient information to put the defaulting party
on notice as to what was necessary to cure the default.
Appellants also cite the court to KIXX,
Stallion Music,

Inc.,

Inc. v.

610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980) for the pro-

position that they properly accelerated payment under the
terms of the real estate contract.

In KIXX,

Inc. v. Stallion

-9-

1

J

c

supra.,

rarher than a

the Court was dealing with a promissory note
real estate contract, but the principal of law

is applicable.

In that case,

this Court held:

It is clear that the notice required is notice
of default and plaintiff's option is exercisable
only if defendants fail to remedy that default
within 30 days after such notice.
Plaintiff's
exercise of its option was therefore premature
as it did not allow defendants the 30 days to
remedy the default.
In Grow v. Marwick Development,
1249 (Utah 1980)

Inc.,

621 P.2d

the sellers sent several written notices to

the defaulting purchasers.

The Court, citing to previous

authority stated:
This court has consistently held that in order
to forfeit a purchaser's interest under a uniform real estate contract, the seller must
comply strictly with the notice provisions of
the contract •
The provisions in the
uniform real estate contract are not selfexecuting and to enforce them, it requires
some affirmative act on the part of the seller to notify the buyer of what specific
provision in the contract the seller is proceeding under and state what the buyer must
do to bring the contract current.
Fuhriman
v. Bissegger, 13 Utah 2d 379, 375 P.2d 27
(Utah 1962), Leone v. Zuniga, 84 lltah 417,
34 P.2d 699 (Utah 1934).
This Court requires certain, definite, and spec1tic notice of

the performance required.

Bank of Utah N.A.
ric>fault
I -.; '-; IJ l ' .

v.

Maxwell,

provisions of a

659 P.2d 1078

In First Security
(Utah 1983), the

real estate contract were again at

rhe buyers had become delinquent on several occasions

-10and sellers had accepted late payments on occasion.

This

court stated:
we think forfeiture should be refused when the
notice given to the delinquent buyer is indefinite or uncertain as to the amount he is to pay
or the performance demanded of him.
Id. at 1081.
In the case at bar, we have no written notice
which can be scrutinized to determine if sufficient notice
was given to the buyers.

The record only indicates that

buyers were informed that the payments had not been paid and
should be.
POINT II
WRITTEN NOTICE OF DEFAULT MUST BE
GIVEN TO THOSE PARTIES WITH WHOM
THE SELLER IS IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT.
Respondents, Nelsons, do not dispute the issue
raised in POINT II of Appellants' Brief that notice of default need only be given to those with whom the seller is in
privity of contract.

However, Respondents assert that writ-

ten notice of default should have been given to the purchasers, Austins, who were in privity, as has been previously
indicated in POINT I herein.
For purposes of this appeal,

the question of

whether notice of default should have been given to any of
the subpurchasers simply is not relevant because inadequate
notice was given to the Austins with whom Appellants were in
privity of contract.

-11POINT III
TENDER TO THE ESCROW COMPANY CONSTITUTED TENDER TO THE APPELLANTS.
It is clear from the record that the Appellants
received payments from the escrow company for a period of
almost two years.

This was done without any objection, ex-

cept for those checks which were returned due to insufficient
funds.

Having accepted payment from Escrow Services, Inc.

for that period of time, Appellants waived any objection that
they may have had to receiving payment from Escrow Services,
Inc.
Respondents do not dispute that the burden was
upon the Austins to see that payment was properly tendered
from Escrow Services to Appellants.

Upon the failure of

Escrow Services to make the June and July, 1982 payments as
agreed between the escrow company and Austins, Austins were
notified verbally by Appellants that payment had not been
received.

At that time,

Defendants began collectively to

obtain sufficient funds to make good the June and July, 1982
payments.

Those payments were tendered to Appellants within

27 days of the first written notice of default in performance.
In any event, though the Trial Court ruled that
payment by Austins to Escrow Services constituted payment to
Appellants,

it does not constitute error sufficient to reverse

the judgment of the Trial Court.

The issue of whether payment

-12to the escrow company constituted payment to Appellants is
only relevant should this Court find that Appellants gave suf
ficient notice to Austins with respect to the default in performance of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The question

of sufficient notice and reasonableness of the time to cure
are the threshold questions which this Court must address.
POINT IV
THE APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
FORECLOSE THE PROPERTY AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
Though it is undisputed that Appellants did not
receive the June and July, 1982 payments when they were due
and Appellants gave verbal notice to Austins of the default
and the default was not remedied within 30 days,

it is also

undisputed that payments for June and July, 1982 were made
to the escrow company which went bankrupt taking Respondents'
money with it and that the verbal notices of default were
indefinite, uncertain, and not specific as to what was required of the Austins to cure the default.
In addition,

in light of the circumstances and

the July 19, 1982 notice being the first written notice of
default received by any of the Respondents, the tender 27
days after written notice was a sufficient tender.
As previously stated in POINT I herein, this
Court has consistently determined that with respect to the
default provisions of a real estate contract, the same are

-13not self-executing and require some affirmative act on the
parr of the seller.
the default.

The seller must give written notice of

Although that is not specifically stated in the

cases cited in POINT I, an analysis of those cases indicates
that written notices of default were sent prior to a notice
of election.

In the case at bar,

the only written notice

received by any of the Respondents was the notice sent to the
Austins exercising their option and electing to foreclose
the contract as a note and a mortgage.
Prior to that time,

it is unclear from the record

what demand was made of Respondents and the content of the
verbal notices given with respect to the default.
POINT V
HAVING ACCEPTED LATE PAYMENTS IN THE
PAST, APPELLANTS CANNOT REQUIRE STRICT
PERFORMANCE.
By Appellants own admission, late payments have
been tendered to them throughout the period of the contract
IR 78,

177).

Having accepted late payments before,

the Ap-

pellants cannot require strict, timely performance without
giving the buyers fair warning to that effect.

Paul v. Kitt,

544 P.2d 886 {Utah 1975).

Without said demand for strict performance with
respect to the time for payment, Appellants are estopped from
1ns1st1n0 on timely payments.
Auqust

lfi,

l'l82,

Assuming that the tender on

27 days after the first written notice of

-14July 19, 1982, was late under the circumstances and facts
before the Court, Appellants are nevertheless precluded
seeking strict performance having waived that right by
accepting late payments in the past.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not err in denying Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Respondent's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

The default provisions

of a real estate contract are not self-executing and in
to enforce the remedies therein, written notice of default
and a demand for cure is required before a party can
with its remedies under the contract.

In addition to written

notice of default and a demand for cure, a reasonable
cure the default,

tc

in light of all the circumstances,

given the defaulting party.
Having failed to give certain, specific, and definite written notice of the default and what was necessary
to cure, Appellants are precluded from foreclosing the property.

The Trial Court judgment should be affirmed and

Respondents should be awarded their attorney's fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of December,
1983.
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